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Medicaid Evolution for the 21St Century
John VJacobi
T HE Affordable Care Act is a complex statute intended to changeAmerican health finance and delivery in myriad ways over its multi-
year implementation period.2 Its core provisions, however, are directed at the
overriding problem that drove its passage: reducing the number of Americans
without health insurance.3 Medicaid was intended to be a major vehicle in that
expansion. One-half of the expansion in insurance coverage has been projected
to come from an increase in Medicaid membership, with estimates of increased
enrollments ranging from seventeen million to almost twenty-three million by
the end of the decade.4 'Ihe Supreme Court's decision in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius transformed the Medicaid expansion from a
required aspect of states' continued participation to a separate, optional add-on
to current state Medicaid programs.s Nonetheless, the Congressional Budget
Office estimates that the Court's decision reduced the number of likely new
Medicaid enrollees under the ACA expansions to a smaller, but still significant,
nine million in 2014, eventually growing to thirteen million by 2023.'
I Dorothea Dix Professor of Health Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law School. Thanks to the
participants in the University of Kentucky College of Law's Medicaid Matters Conference for their
acute insights in to the future of Medicaid.
2 The "Affordable Care Act" (ACA) is comprised of two separate acts: the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. u9 (20zo) (codified in scattered sections of
25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2oo, Pub. L.
No.mI-152,124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 26 and 40 U.S.C.),
which amended Public Law Number 1in-i48. These statutes will be referred to collectively as the
"ACA."
3 See Barack Obama, Securing the Future ofAmerican Health Care, 365 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1377,
1379 (2012) (explaining that the ACA will expand health insurance availability through market
reforms, Medicaid expansion, and subsidies for low-income Americans).
4 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS
OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 5 fig.1
(2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/4 3 47 2-o7--24-2o2-
CoverageEstimates.pdf (seventeen million), with JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID
COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE RESULTS FOR
ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL, at 5 (May 1, 2010), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
cOm/2013/oL/medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-health-reform-national-and-state-by-state-
results-for-adults-at-or-below-33-fpl.pdf (22.8 million under an "enhanced outreach scenario").
5 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-05 (2012).
6 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MAY 20I3 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE tbls. I & 2 (2013) available at http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/4.49oEffectsAffordableCareActHealthlnsuranceCover-
age_2.pdf.
357
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Can the Medicaid program bear the weight of these expectations? Some
critics argue that Medicaid is "broken" and is, therefore, an unsuitable vehicle
for health system reform.! Even supporters of the Medicaid program have
recognized that its recipients have historically fared less well in both access
to care and health outcomes than privately insured persons, although research
suggests that many of these shortfalls are due to the demographic makeup of the
Medicaid program, and not the program itself.' Part I of this paper will examine
the extent to which Medicaid differs from other health finance programs.
It will then examine in Part II the assertion that Medicaid is "broken," and
whether some of the unique aspects of Medicaid shed light on this debate.
Part III will examine proposals for adapting Medicaid to the needs of twenty-
first century health care in order to serve the poor and vulnerable Americans
for whom Medicaid is intended, and who, to this point, have been relatively
poorly served by the health finance and delivery systems. Finally, in Part IV,
this paper will focus on Medicaid financing and delivery changes encouraged
by the ACA that can serve an evolutionary function for the Medicaid program.
It will address a central paradox facing Medicaid: in order to provide care for
Medicaid's recipients that is equivalent to care delivered to privately insured
patients-the governing vision of Medicaid from its inception'-the states and
federal regulators properly point to the need for the adoption of evidence-
based practices that improve outcomes and access. On the other hand, to serve
the sickest, most vulnerable, and most socially marginalized segment of our
population, we must embrace the leadership of local, trusted community leaders.
'The paradox is that top-down research-tested methods must be carefully
blended with reliance on bottom-up leadership from civil society.
7 See, e.g., Kevin D. Dayaratna, Studies Show: Medicaid Patients Have Worse Access and Outcomes
than the Privately Insured, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, NO. 2740, Nov. 7, 2012, at I, http://
thf media.s3 .amazonaws.com/2O12/pdf/bg2 74 o.pdf (referring to Medicaid as a "broken program").
8 See Teresa A. Coughlin et al., AssessingAccess to Care Under Medicaid Evidence for the Nation
and Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFF., no. 4, 2oo5, at 1073, ro81 (explaining that the shortfall in ac-
cess for Medicaid beneficiaries is largely due to demographic factors and health status, and not the
structure of the Medicaid program).
9 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal
Access"Provision, 73 U. Cm. L. REV. 673, 675 (2oo6) ("Before 1965, healthcare services were described
as'dual-tracked': the wealthy received care from private physicians while the poor-if they accessed
services at all-received care in ambulatory clinics and emergency rooms. Medicaid's goal was to
eliminate the lower track, providing everyone with access to private physicians and high quality
hospitals.").
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I. WHY IS MEDICAID DIFFERENT
FROM OTHER HEALTH FINANCE PROGRAMS?
Medicaid was created in 1965 as a companion to Medicare. Unlike
Medicare, which was intended as a contributory social insurance system
for the elderly, Medicaid was intended to shore up the existing patchwork
of state systems, and, funded in part by the federal government, to provide
health care services to the poor."o From the beginning, Medicaid recognized
the historical primacy of the states as providers for the poor, but also initiated
an increased regulatory role for the federal government to enforce some basic
coverage principles as conditions of states'receipt of the federal funds available
under the program." Like its sister program, Medicare, Medicaid did not
interfere with the financial freedom of health care providers; like private health
insurance coverage, it set about creating payment mechanisms that would lead
providers to participate voluntarily in Medicaid as they did in private insurance
programs.12 Medicaid, then, deviated from precursor systems: "[I]n its essential
structure, Medicaid resembled not a grant program to clinics and hospitals,
but instead a 'third party payment' system structured to operate like insurance,
paying 'participating' health care professionals and institutions for covered
services furnished to enrolled persons."" Medicaid was set up as something
akin to a public insurance system, but became increasingly cabined over time by
statutory and regulatory provisions that bar the states'Medicaid programs from
running, as private insurance does, on a market-oriented, risk-sensitive basis.14
As Medicaid has developed, it has deviated more and more from the private
insurance model on which it was loosely based, in three essential ways: first,
those covered are mostly uninsurable in private markets; second, the services
covered extend beyond those covered in commercial insurance; and third, the
structure, adjusted by many amendments over the years, is much more complex
than any private insurance product.
to See id; see also Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a
Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 5, 8-9 (20o6). See generally ROBERT
STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID
51-52 (Transaction Publishers 2003) (1974) (detailing the genesis of the Medicaid program and of-
fering a thorough assessment of its implementation and evolution).
ix Rosenbaum, supra note so, at 9.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § r396a(a)(3o)(A) (2012) (setting out principles of reimbursement).The extent
to which Medicaid now, or indeed ever, lived up to this statutory requirement is discussed infra,
Part Ii.
13 Rosenbaum, supra note io, at 9.
14 Id. at io.
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A. Who is covered?
Prior to the expansions permitted by the ACA, Medicaid enrollees have
been limited to the most medically precarious: the poor and vulnerable." In
short, they are exactly the people private insurers do not wish to cover. They are
poor, and also "categorically eligible." That is, in addition to meeting income
and assets requirements, enrollees are required to be blind, disabled, elderly,
pregnant women, children, or in families with children. 16 These groups represent
predictably high-cost insureds. A child with disabilities, for example, requires
about four times the health expenditures of a child without disabilities," and
people over the age of sixty-five are similarly expensive to cover." In Medicaid,
the elderly and people with disabilities comprise only about 25% of enrollees,
but account for about 65% of the program's cost." The distribution of health
care usage generally, and predictably, is very skewed toward the elderly and
people with disabilities and chronic illnesses, with the most-ill 5% utilizing
about half of the health care resources, and the least-ill 50% accounting for only
about 3% of annual health expenditures.2 0 On the basis of their age and health
history, then, Medicaid enrollees are likely to need a great deal of care and will
be essentially uninsurable under the circumstances.
In addition, people in the Medicaid program raise identity issues beyond
disability and age. The non-elderly enrollment in Medicaid is over 53% Black
or Hispanic, although those two groups comprise only about 30% of the
American population.2' The long history of race- and ethnicity-based health
disparities in American health care strongly suggests that the overrepresentation
of people of color in Medicaid will reflect poorer health outcomes-regardless
5 Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Rethinking Medicaid in the New Normal, 5 ST.
Louis J. HEALTH LAW & PoL'Y 127, 127-28 (2011).
16 42 U.S.C. § i3 9 6a(a)(io)(A)(i) (2012).
17 Paul W Newacheck et al., Health Services Use and Health Care Expenditures for Children
with Disabilities, 114 PEDIATRICS 79, 81 (2004).
18 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Does the Aging ofthe Population Really Drive the Demandfor Health
Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF., no. 6, 2003, at 27, 27 ("Average per capita health spending for Americans
age sixty-five and older was more than triple that for Americans ... ages 34-44 in 1999.").
19 KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM-
ILY FOUND., MEDICAID: A PRIMER 26 (2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2oo/o6/7334-o5.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID PRIMER].
20 THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 8 (2012), http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.Com/201 3/oI/ 7 67o-o 3 .pdf; see also Marc L. Berk & Alan C.
Monheit, 7he Concentration ofHealth Care Expenditures, Revisited, 22 HEALTH Art., no. 2, 2001, at
9,15-16 (citing similar figures).
21 Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012,
at 107 tbl.x48, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2o2/tables/12soI 4 8.pdf (53-4%
of non-elderly Medicaid recipients in 2009 were either Black or Hispanic), with State & County
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ooooo.html (last up-
dated June 27, 2013) (3o% of Americans were either Black or Hispanic in 2012).
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of any faults of the Medicaid program itself.22 "For example, relative to whites,
African Americans and Hispanics are less likely to receive appropriate cardiac
medication . . . or to undergo coronary artery bypass surgery, even when
the variations in such factors as insurance status, income, age, co-morbid
conditions, and symptom expression are taken into account."23 In addition to
the effects of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status has a demonstrable effect
on health status, independent of insurance status.24 Regardless of the causes of
these effects, they establish that people covered by Medicaid are more medically
fragile, have more complex health conditions, and are affected by determinants
of poor health, independent of their access to health coverage or care.
B. What is covered?
Medicaid also differs from other health finance programs in the breadth of
services covered.'The program covers services included in commercial insurance,
including preventive, curative, and restorative physician, pharmacy, and hospital
services. In addition, however, Medicaid mandates that states cover long-term
care services, home care services, transportation services to and from service
providers, Federally Qualified Health Center services, and rural health clinic
services.2s In addition, many states have added "optional" services that are not
mandated, but for which the federal government will provide funding if added
by a state plan. The most common of these services include dental, eyeglass,
prostheses, and personal care services, as well as intermediate care facility
services for individuals with intellectual disabilities. 26
22 See David R. Williams & Pamela Braboy Jackson, Social Sources of Racial Disparities in
Health, 24 HEALTH AFF. 325, 327-30 (2005) (discussing how differences in socioeconomic status,
neighborhood conditions, and medical care contribute to the poorer health of African-Americans);
see also Sidney D. Watson, Section 7if7 ofthe Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Reform, Race,
and Equity, 55 How. L.J. 855, 857 (2012) ("[H]ealth insurance and health care remain racially and
ethnically segregated with one heath care system serving disproportionately white patients with
private insurance and a different 'safety net' system serving minority patients with Medicaid and
the uninsured."). See generally BRIAN D. SMEDLEY ET AL., INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003) (assessing the reasons
for racial disparities in health care and offering strategies for more equitable care).
23 SMEDLEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 30.
24 See Paula Braveman et al., 7he Social Determinants of Health: Coming ofAge, 32 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 381, 382-84 (20I) ("Finally, U.S. public health leaders and researchers have increas-
ingly recognized that the dramatic health problems we face cannot be successfully addressed by
medical care alone."); Williams &Jackson, supra note 22, at 327-28 ("Racial differences in socioeco-
nomic status, neighborhood residential conditions, and medical care are important contributors to
racial differences in disease.").
25 42 U.S.C. § i39 6d(a) (2012); MEDICAID PRIMER, supra note 19, at 13.
26 MEDICAID PRIMER, supra note 19, at 14; see also Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 15, at
128-29 ("Medicaid compensates for Medicare's limitations for the poorest beneficiaries, paying
program premiums and cost-sharing and covering Medicare-excluded services ranging from eye-
glasses and hearing aids to long-term care.").
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This broad coverage fits Medicaid's programmatic mission to assist the
states in fulfilling their traditional mission of serving the health needs of
the poor and vulnerable. Some of the additional services included in many
Medicaid programs, such as coverage of eyeglasses and dental services, simply
reflect a recognition that the poor do not have the disposable income to pay for
services and devices that have a relatively low expected cost. Other benefits, like
intermediate care facilities for people with intellectual disabilities and home
care services, reflect the need to provide services for the very conditions that
give rise to the vulnerability entitling individuals to Medicaid services. The
slate of covered services, then, reflects the poor, elderly, or disabled condition of
Medicaid enrollees.
C. Complex structure.
The structure of Medicaid is famously complex. Unlike Medicare, which
is wholly federally funded and governed, Medicaid requires that the federal
and state governments work in partnership 27 -a relationship that has been
notably strained recently. Its basic structure, as leading historians of Medicaid
have observed, lacked coherence and clarity as a social insurance system for
three reasons: first, it failed to cover all of the poor, but extended only to the
categorically eligible; second, the definition and scope of medical services
covered were variable from state to state; and third, the income eligibility
standards varied, in some cases dramatically, from state to state." In sum, the
program remained a balkanized system funded by the federal government but
largely run by the states. 29 Perhaps most critically, states retained substantial
power to determine how much to pay providers for their services, and states
have taken advantage of that power."o
Medicaid was criticized as rather "ill-designed" and "vague" from the
beginning." It paid providers on a fee-for-service basis, as did insurers." But
federal payments, forming the majority of Medicaid financing, were structured
as a grant-in-aid program for the states, which were largely in charge of
maintaining a network of willing providers." Unlike private insurance, the
27 See STEVENS & STEVENS, Supra note so, at 57-61 (describing the shared federal-state find-
ing and regulatory responsibilities); see also Rosenbaum, supra note so, at 9 ("Medicaid rested on a
financial base consisting of a shared federal/state contribution arrangement ...
28 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note to, at 57-58.
29 Id.
30 Moncrieff, supra note 9, at 673-74.
31 STEVENS & STEVENS, Supra note lo, at 51.
32 See Rosenbaum, supra note to, at 9 ("But in its essential structure, Medicaid resembled not
a grant program to clinics and hospitals, but instead a 'third party payment' system structured to
operate like insurance, paying 'participating' health care professionals and institutions for covered
services furnished to enrolled persons.").
33 STEVENS & STEVENS, Supra note so, at 52.
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Medicaid program has grown, adding components over the years ranging
beyond traditional medical care to address the needs of the target population.14
In addition, millions oflow-income elderly persons and persons with long-term
disabilities qualify for both Medicaid and Medicare, and use Medicare as the
primary payer for services.They rely on Medicaid, however, to pay for Medicare's
coinsurance and deductibles, and for those health care services covered by
Medicaid but not Medicare." One major source of Medicaid's complexity has
been states' gradual movement away from the role of public insurer to the role
of public payor, devolving many insurer functions to commercial HMOs.
The movement toward then-novel HMOs as fiscal and programmatic
intermediaries began within five years of Medicaid's creation.16 California was
a pioneer in the use of Medicaid HMOs. Widespread claims of fraudulent
sales practices and inadequate provider networks frustrated these efforts and
led federal regulators to impose relatively stringent requirements for the use of
Medicaid managed care." By 1980, only about 1% of Medicaid enrollees were
in HMOs." During the 1980s, however, Medicaid officials in the Reagan and
George H.W. Bush administrations relaxed many ofthe restrictions on the use of
Medicaid HMOs, although these efforts only raised the percentage of enrollees
to about 12%.'9 During the 1990s, mostly through the use of Section 1115
waivers40 or Section 1915(b) waivers, 41 the number of Medicaid enrollees in
HMOs grew dramatically "from 9.5 percent of total Medicaid enrollment in
1991 to 40.1 percent in 1996."2 These waivers from usual Medicaid regulatory
requirements were necessary because state managed care programs limited the
range of enrollees' choice of providers and varied, by location within states,
enrollees' access to services.43 Then, as part of the Balanced Budget Act of
34 See Rosenbaum, supra note io, at so ("Over its lifetime, Medicaid has been transformed
by an astounding agglomeration of legislative provisions and interpretative guidelines and rules.").
35 See id. at 129.
36 STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note io, at 229. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)
were initially devised as a health care reform. Id Instead of purchasing insurance or making vendor
payments, Medicaid would buy "health maintenance contracts," hich c 1o, at 229. Medicaid woud-
which specified services designed to protect the Medicaid recipient's health. Id
37 See Michael Sparer, Medicaid Managed Care: Costs, Access, and Quality of Care, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 3 (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.rwjforg/content/dam/farm/reports/re-
ports/2012/rwjf4oio6.
38 Maren D. Anderson & Peter D. Fox, Lessons Learned from Medicaid Managed Care Ap-
proaches, 6 HEALTH AFF., no. 1, 1987, at 71, 72.
39 Sparer, supra note 37, at 3.
40 Authorized under the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 1115, 49 Stat. 690 (1935)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012)).
41 Authorized under the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74 -27I, § l 9i 5(b), 49 Stat. 690 (1935)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13 9 6n(b) (2012)).
42 John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, 17 HEALTH AFF., no.3, 1998,
at 43, 43 (citing data from the Health Care Financing Administration, which is now the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
43 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID AND CHIP RIsK-BASED MANAGED
2013- 20141 363
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
1997," states obtained the authority to mandate HMO enrollment for most
Medicaid beneficiaries.45
In an effort to contain Medicaid costs, states have continued to move
toward managed care.46 By 2010, most states had moved the majority of
their enrollees to HMOs, and almost two-thirds of Medicaid enrollees were
in managed care.47 For most states, the movement to HMOs for Medicaid
enrollees has not resulted in the hoped-for cost savings,48 and the shift seems
not to have improved the quality of care or access to providers. 49 Medicaid
programs have, then, largely moved from directly administering provider
payments to purchasing insurance coverage for enrollees from private vendors.
In other words, most states have largely privatized what had been among their
most important programmatic functions: selecting, maintaining, monitoring,
and compensating health care providers for many of their Medicaid enrollees.
This "decentralization" of government function not only saved states the
administrative and staffing costs of network formation and maintenance, but
also, to some extent, relieved them of the always-delicate task of intermediating
between providers and enrollees. 5 0
II. Is MEDICAID BROKEN?
As governors considered their options following the Supreme Court's
conversion of the ACA's Medicaid expansion from a mandatory to an optional
program, many expressed various reasons for resisting what appeared to be a
good deal; the federal government will bear 100% of the costs of those newly
eligible for Medicaid in the years 2014,2015, and 2016.1 The federal matching
amount will reduce slightly after that, stabilizing at 90% in 2020 and thereafter.52
CARE IN 20 STATES: EXPERIENCES OVER THE PAST DECADE AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
1-2 (2012), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/20o2/medicaidandchipmanagedcarePay-
ments/rpt.pdf.
44 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 11 Stat. 251 (997)-
45 42 U.S.C. § 1396m-2 (2012).
46 Sparer, supra note 37, at 4.
47 Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Are State Medicaid Managed Care Programs Ready for 2014? A
Review ofEight States, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 2 (May 29, 20I3), http://www.rwjf.org/
content/dam/farm/reports/issue-briefs/20z3/rwjf4o6305-
48 Sparer, supra note 37, at 11-2.
49 Id. at 15-21.
50 See STEVENS & STEVENS, Supra note so, at 229-30.
51 42 U.S.C. § 396d(y) (2012).
52 Id. The Rand Corporation performed an economic analysis of participation versus non-
participation in the ACAs Medicaid expansion and concluded that, from an economic perspective,
states would benefit from participating, even taking into account many of the objections raised by
skeptics. The conclusions of the study, more fily described, were:
The bottom line is that the expansion of Medicaid eligibility is a key provision of the
Affordable Care Act. If the fourteen states that have said they will opt out of Med-
icaid expansion do so, 3.6 million fewer people will have health insurance than would
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Nevertheless, the governors'objections were several, with many based on fears of
state costs" or skepticism that Congress would continue to fund the program as
described in the ACA.5 4 Other critics cited fraud within the Medicaid program
as a reason to resist its expansion," although they failed to acknowledge the
presence of fraud in the private insurance system.s 6 Other critics, including
some governors, expressed concern that membership in Medicaid would "foster
dependency."" In addition, it is often argued that enrollees have difficulty
gaining access to care, and that they suffer bad outcomes from the care they
receive." Several of the objectors appear to overstate the evidence that the
otherwise be the case. 'This would save the federal government around s8.4 billion a
year compared to the full expansion of Medicaid. However, the states that opted out
of Medicaid expansion would see a net increase in spending in the short term because
they would spend more on uncompensated care. Furthermore, even states that opt out
of the expansion will be subject to the reductions in Medicare payments and dispropor-
tionate-share hospital payments, as well as various other taxes and fees in the Afford-
able Care Act. Thus, there may be large net transfers of federal funds out of the states
that do not expand Medicaid.
Carter C. Price & Christine Eibner, For States 7hat Opt Out of Medicaid Expansion: 3.6 Million
Fewer Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1030, 1035 (2013).
53 Although, this concern is apparently at odds with the Rand economic analysis. See Price &
Eibner, supra note 51.
54 See Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, US. Governors and the MedicaidExpan-
sion - No Quick Resolution in Sight, 386 NEw ENG. J. MED. 496, 498 (2013); see also Robert Pear &
Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States over Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/o6/30/us/politics/some-states-reluctant-over-medicaid-expan-
sion.htmil.
55 Grace-Marie Turner &Avik Roy, Why States ShouldNotExpandMedicaid, GALEN INsT. 7
(May 1, 2013), http://www.galen.org/assets/StatesshouldblockMedicaidexpansion.pdf (arguing that
between 10-30% of Medicaid payments are based on fraudulent claims).
56 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Health Insurance FraudAn Overview, GEORGE WASHINGTON MED.
CTR. I (2009), http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/dhp-publications/pub-uploads/
dhpPublicationEFDADiBC-o 5 6- 9 D2o- 3 D3D 366 32A4 F216 3 .pdf (citation omitted). The au-
thors of that study explained:
What is absolutely clear from virtually every reliable source on the subject is that health
care fraud is a systemic problem affecting public and private insurers alike, in the in-
dividual market, the employer-sponsored group market, and public programs. Because
Medicare and Medicaid are government-sponsored and thus are required to report on
fraud, the problem is perhaps better known, but combating fraud is a challenge that
faces both public and private insurers. Indeed, one survey found that since 1995, 90% of
all private insurers have launched anti-fraud campaigns.
Id.
57 Sommers & Epstein, supra note 54, at 498 ("For instance, [Governor] Dennis Daugaard (R-
SD) declared that'able-bodied adults should be self-reliant .... "'); Turner & Roy, supra note 55, at 5.
58 Sommers & Epstein, supra note 54, at 498 ("[Governor] Rick Perry (R-TX) said that adding
uninsured Texans to Medicaid is 'not unlike adding a thousand people to the Titanic."'); Dayaratna,
supra note 7, at 1-5; Jonathan Ingram, Medicaid Expansion Would Trap Illinoisans in Inferior Care,
ILL. POL'Y INST. I (Dec. 4, 2012), http://illinoispolicy.org/uploads/files/Medicaid Expansion.pdf;
Turner & Roy, supra note 55, at 2-3.
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Medicaid program causes the bad outcomes they cite;"clearly, however, they
are on to something.
It is a valid criticism ofMedicaid that it has been unable "to assure appropriate
access to care for the poor. Medicaid has historically suffered under serious
limitations owing to the widespread physician non-participation, particularly
in the case of specialty care."so The outcomes for Medicaid enrollees are worse
than they are for the privately insured, although that difference appears to be
largely attributable to the very demographic and health conditions that qualify
enrollees for the Medicaid program.6 1 "Access" in this context translates into
provider participation; if physicians decline to participate in Medicaid, then
access is denied. As with so many other aspects of Medicaid, the extent of the
physician participation crisis varies from state to state. 62 In Wyoming, 99.3% of
office-based physicians are accepting new Medicaid patients. In New Jersey, the
rate stands at 40.4%.63 Other states'numbers are smoothly distributed between
those extremes. 6 That is, fewer than one in a hundred Wyoming physicians
would turn down a new Medicaid patient, while sixty out of a hundred New
Jersey physicians would turn a new Medicaid patient away.6s Nationally, fewer
than 70% of physicians are willing to accept new Medicaid patients, compared
with the 81.7% willing to accept privately insured patients.66
59 For example, critics like to point to a large study undertaken by researchers at the Univer-
sity of Virginia Health System relating the public or private insurer to the outcomes of surgery.
E.g., Turner & Roy, supra note 55, at 3; Press Release, Senator Tom Coburn, Revealing New Study:
Medicaid Patients More Likely to Die After Surgery, Have Longer Stay and Higher Costs (Aug. ni,
20oo), available at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/rightnow?ContentRecord
id=2e922 9e4 -cef2- 4 oa8-84f3 -d 9 d5 917 7ae9f Both of these critics suggest that the cited study found
a causal relationship between enrollment in Medicaid and the poor surgical outcomes, apparently
mistaking correlation for causation. The study's authors drew no such conclusion, although the
correlation was strong. Instead, the researchers drew attention to the determinants of ill health
associated with Medicaid enrollees:
In this study, we conclude that Medicaid and Uninsured payer status confers in-
creased risk adjusted in-hospital mortality compared with Private Insurance for major
surgical operations in the United States. Medicaid is further associated with er
postoperative in-hospital complications as well as the greatest adjusted length o stay
and total costs despite risk factors or the specific major operation. These differences
serve as an important proxy for larger socioeconomic and health system-related issues
that could be targeted to improve surgical outcomes for US patients.
Damien J. LaPar et al., Primary Payer Status Affects Mortalityfor Major Surgical Operations, 252 AN-
NALS OF SURG. 544, 550 (200); see also Damien J. LaPar et al., Primary Payer Status Affects Mortal-
ity for Major Surgical Operations 8 (Apr. 11, 20n) (unpublished extended manuscript), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 3 07i622/pdf/nihms2 7 9555.pdf
6o Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 1S, at 135-36 (citation omitted).
61 See Coughlin et al., supra note 8, at o8i; supra text accompanying notes 15-24.
62 Sarah L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-7hird of Physicians Said 7hey Would Not Accept New
Medicaid Patients, But Rising Fees May Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1675-76 (2012).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1675 (noting that the percentage is slightly lower for primary care physicians).
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Low physician participation rates appear not to be a function of "the percent
of Medicaid enrollees in the state, the percentage of the Medicaid population
in capitated managed care plans, or the number of physicians per capita in the
state.""6 Physicians are, however, more likely to accept new Medicaid patients
in states with higher reimbursement rates relative to Medicare.68 Wyoming, for
example, has the highest physician participation rate, and its Medicaid rates
are about 140% of the Medicare rate.69 New Jersey, on the other hand, has the
lowest physician participation rate, and its Medicaid rates are about 37% of
Medicare. 70
Physicians may decline to participate in Medicaid for reasons beyond
low rates, including discomfort working with the poor, largely minority, and
frequently disabled membership in the program. 7 ' Also, physicians in states
with low reimbursement rates may be distrustful of their state Medicaid
program after decades of low payment, broken promises, and administrative
difficulties. 72
Poor provider participation rates are certainly problematic to Medicaid
going forward and are no doubt related to the quality problems Medicaid
has experienced. The relationship should not be overstated, however. As is
described above, Medicaid is a program for people with high levels of disability,
socioeconomic markers for poor health status, and demographic factors
closely correlated with illness.73 However, critics' diagnosis that low provider
participation rates, driven in part by low reimbursement rates, ill-serves
Medicaid-eligible people cannot be dismissed. Since a major thread in the call
for rejection of Medicaid expansion is the cost, is the logic of this access-based
criticism persuasive? Not, recent research indicates, if the implication is that
covering those disenfranchised from Medicaid in private insurance is cheaper.
67 Id. at 1676.
6 8 Id.
69 Id. at 1678.
70 Id. Even with respect to enrollees in Medicaid HMOs, it is the states, and not the market
or the federal government, that control physician reimbursement rates. States contract with HMOs
for Medicaid business, and can contract for network adequacy terms that directly or indirectly lead
to higher or lower physician payment rates.
71 See Jessica Greene et al., Race, Segregation, and Physicians' Participation in Medicaid, 84
THE MILBANK Q239, 262-63 (2006) available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doihio.iiiij.1468-
000 9 .2006.oo 4 4 7.x/fsll; Mari-Lynn Drainoni et al., Cross-Disability Experiences of Barriers to
Health-Care Access, 17 J. oF DISABILITY PoL'Y STUD. 10I, IIO-III (2006) available at http://dps.
sagepub.com/content/i7/2/oi.short.
72 See Peter J. Cunningham & Ann S. O'Malley, Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage Med-
icaid Participation By Physicians?, 28 HEALTH AFF. w17, w18 (2009) available at http://content.
healthaffairs.org/content/28//wi 7.full.pdf+html.
73 See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
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A recent study by Coughlin and colleagues of the Urban Institute
examined this precise question: Would it be less expensive to insure adults
in the private market or in the Medicaid program? 7 4 The researchers studied
adults with household income "at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty
line," reflecting the income levels of newly eligible adults.75 They compared
this group with adults covered by employment-based insurance in terms of
"demographic, socioeconomic, and health status dimensions" by including a
realistic assessment of the "demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of
the individual and family; the individual's health and disability status, health
conditions and limitation; and characteristics of the local community such as
provider supply, health care cost variation, local economy and local demand for
health services.""
The researchers concluded that the cost of opting for private insurance-
even at premiums for employment-based coverage-would be enormous."
The per-person cost, "(excluding out-of-pocket spending) would be higher
by about $1,700, going from $6,052 to $7,752, over a 25 percent increase,"78
a difference almost entirely attributable to the higher reimbursement rates in
private insurance as compared to Medicaid. 7The personal cost would also
be higher, with out-of-pocket costs rising to $784 per person, compared with
$257 in Medicaid.s0 The researchers did not neglect the network adequacy
problems with Medicaid, noting that Medicaid participants were more likely
than the privately insured to use hospital emergency departments for primary
care." They also noted barriers in access to specialty care.82
To the extent, then, that "privatization" of Medicaid were to simply
subsidize enrollees' entry into commercial insurance, the results would be
unfavorable. Medicaid is a program with problems but simply shifting enrollees
to commercial plans seems not to solve those problems. The recent study by
Coughlin and colleagues raises fundamental issues with simple privatization.
The crippling increase in out-of-pocket costs for low-income persons inherent
in a switch from Medicaid to private insurance alone suggests that such a move
would be problematic. As the ACA's subsidy systems demonstrate, however,
74 TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL., KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,THE
HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES MEDICAID MAKE? ASSESSING COST
EFFECTIVENESS, ACCESS, AND FINANCIAL PROTECTION UNDER MEDICAID FOR LOW-INCOME
ADULTS 7 (May 3, 2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2o3/o5/844o-what-
difference-does-medicaid-make2.pdf (study funded by Kaiser and conducted by the Urban In-
stitute).
75 Id. at 3.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 7.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8o Id. at 7.
85 Id. at 9.
82 Id
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programs can limit out-of-pocket spending on the basis of income status,
although such a switch would only add to the cost of privatization.
Leaving out-of-pocket costs aside, however, critics of existing Medicaid
seem to be left with three choices for the expansion population: traditional
Medicaid, private insurance (at a substantially more expensive price), or an
undisclosed insurance package that is stripped down enough to pay providers
private-market reimbursement rates at premium levels below Medicaid's. The
critics of Medicaid are correct that it often provides lesser access to care than
does private insurance due to limitations in provider participation. It is likely,
however, that "privatizing" Medicaid would require either high cost-sharing
for beneficiaries with little disposable income, substantially higher provider
reimbursement, or stripped-down benefits for vulnerable patients. The way
forward, in the absence of a broader national health reform in which all
receive the level of care enjoyed by privately insured individuals, must be to fix
Medicaid. In particular, as described in the following sections, a fix is necessary
in those locations where state inaction and crumbling health care systems
imperil American patients as well as in settings in which complex, vulnerable,
and high-cost patients experience fragmented, episodic care.84
III. How DOES THE ACA PROMOTE A
MORE EFFECTIVE MEDICAID?
As is suggested in the previous section, Medicaid is not irredeemably
broken, but, nevertheless, is in need of improvements if it is to serve the needs
of its enrollees. This section will address three promising improvements to the
Medicaid program, largely fostered by the ACA: the shoring up of primary
care, fostering case management and coordinated care for people with chronic
illnesses, and broad collaborations to provide care to Medicaid beneficiaries.
These improvements go a long way toward addressing the genuine concerns
regarding the strength of the Medicaid program.
83 42 U.S.C. § 8o7i (2012); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH
CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES I (July I, 2012), http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2o 3 /or/7 9 62-02.pdf.
84 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note lo, at xviii-xix (relating similar problems in the early
years of Medicaid).
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A. Primary Care
The discussion in the previous section explained that the shortfall in physician
participation in Medicaid is not entirely the result of low reimbursement rates.ss
At the same time, there appears to be at least some dose-response effect related
to fee increases. 6 'Ihat is, it appears that relatively substantial fee increases could
draw at least some physicians into the program." In order to create incentives to
increase enrollees'access to primary care, the ACA increased Medicaid primary
care reimbursements for a two-year period to the Medicare rate:
The health reform law requires states, in 2013 and 2014, to pay at least 100
percent of Medicare physician fees for close to 150 different primary care
services provided to Medicaid enrollees by certain physicians. Physicians in
the specialties of famil medicine, general internal medicine and pediatrics
are designated to qua for the increased fees, and federal regulations clarify
that subspecialists can also receive the enhanced rates. To qualify physicians
must attest that they are Board-certified and/or that at least 60 percent
of their Medicaid services in the previous year were primary care services
to which the fee increase applies. The enhanced Medicaid rates are also
available for services deiveredby nurse ractitioners and 5 hysician assistants
under the personal supervision of a qualified physician.
The increases will raise fees for covered services by an average of 73%, although
the increases will be greater in those states in which provider fees have been
the lowest." Although those increases have been delayed, they are expected to
begin by fall of 2013, and payments will be made retroactive to January 2013."
In addition to this general increase in primary care reimbursement rates, the
ACA specifically targets Federally Qualified Health Centers ("Health Centers")
for financial support." 1 These centers form "one of the largest safety net systems
85 See supra notes 6o-66 and accompanying text.
86 See Decker, supra note 62, at 1676 (relating provider payment to participation rates).
87 See id
88 STEPHEN ZUcKERMAN & DANA GOIN, KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How MUCH WILL MEDICAID PHYSICIAN FEES FOR PRI-
MARY CARE RISE IN 2013? EVIDENCE FROM A 2012 SURVEY OF MEDICAID PHYSICIAN FEES 4 (Dec.
13, 2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.cOm/2013/o/8398.pdf.
89 Id. at 7-8; see also Karen Davis et al., How theAffordable CareAct Will Strengthen the Nation's
Primary Care Foundation, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1201, 1202 (2010) (explaining that increased
reimbursement rates under the ACA will have a "differential impact on physicians depending on
where they practice").
90 See Bruce Japsen, Obamacare's 73% Medicaid Pay Raise for Doctors Is Delayed, FORBES (Mar.
15, 2013, 8:43 AM), (payment increase scheduled for January 1, 2013 delayed) http://www.forbes.
com/sites/brucejapsen/2013/03/I5/obamacares- 73-medicaid-pay-raise-for-doctors-is-delayed;
More delays expected for Medicaid parity reimbursements, MEDICAL EcoNoMICs (August 25, 2013),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/more-delays-expect-
ed-medicaid-parity-reimbursements (explaining that payment increases are being made in some
states, whereas other states plan to increase payments soon).
91 The Affordable Care Act and Health Centers, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
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of primary and preventive care in the country."92 The Health Centers serve a
high proportion of members of minority groups and are an essential component
in providing Medicaid's services to vulnerable communities." The ACA will
provide $9.5 billion for operations of existing Health Centers, creation of new
sites in medically underserved areas, and expansion of primary care services.94
In addition, it will provide $1.5 billion "to support major construction and
renovation projects at community health centers nationwide." 5
B. Coordinated Care for People with Chronic Conditions
A high percentage of people on Medicaid have chronic conditions. "More
than 9 million people qualify for Medicaid based on a disability, and many
of these individuals have particularly complex needs-almost one-half of
them suffer from mental illness and 45% are diagnosed with three or more
chronic conditions."96 Enrollees with chronic conditions are disproportionately
expensive to treat." The higher cost of treating the chronically ill in Medicaid
squares with general chronic care research, which has established that the costs
of care for people with one chronic condition are about twice that of people
without such conditions, and the costs of care for people with two or more
chronic conditions are almost six times as much.99 Chronic illness is on the
rise generally in the United States and as a result, Americans'health care needs
have shifted in recent decades from acute care, focusing on one or a few clinical
encounters, to chronic care, which often requires long courses of care from
professionals with a variety of competencies."
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. I (Aug. 11, 2013), http://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/healthcenterfactsheet.pdf
("For more than 45 years, health centers have delivered comprehensive, high-quality preventive and
primary health care to patients regardless of their ability to pay.").
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1-2.
94 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § Io503(c), 124 Stat. ii9,
1004 (200); TheAffordable Care Act and Health Centers, supra note 91, at 2.
95 § io503(c); see TheAffordable Care Act and Health Centers, supra note 91, at 2.
96 MIKE NARDONE ET AL., KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,THE HEN-
RY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID HEALTH HOMES FOR BENEFICIARIES WITH CHRONIC
CONDITIONS 4 (Aug. I, 2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.cOm/2013/oi/834o.pdf.
97 Id
98 Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons with Chronic Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276
JAMA 1473, 1476 (1996).
99 ROBERT L. KANE ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS 7-9 (2005).
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One of the barriers to providing high-quality care to people with chronic
illnesses is the frequent failure to coordinate their various caregivers.' 0 Robert
Kane, one of the leading clinical researchers into care for people with chronic
conditions, has described the problem in the following terms:
Patients with chronic conditions suffer from fragmented services
when they are treated not as persons but instead are segmented or
compartmentalized into discrete organs or body systems. If health care
professionals treat a malfunctioning system of the body rather than the
person as a whole, (i.e., treat disease in the patient rather than treat the
patient with disease), treatment can become a series of medical interventions
that target only the disease and ignore the ill person.'
Such fragmentation is common, and creates health dangers to patients with
chronic illnesses through lost opportunities for appropriate care and conflicting
treatments that can do more harm than good:
Rarely in a fragmented, poorly coordinated health care system is a single
health care professional or entity responsible for a patient s overall care ...
Imprecise chnical responsibility increases the chance that some services ...
may not be provided at all. Among people with chronic conditions 71%
report having no help coordinating their care ... and 17% say they have
received contradictory medical information from health care professionals.1 02
Models of coordinated care, aimed at correcting the ill effects of this
fragmentation, have developed in recent years."' Coordinated care models tend
to include multidisciplinary teams using evidence-based treatments, frequent
clinical visits, and periodic meetings with the patient and his or her family.o0 In
addition to promising clinical improvements and gains in patient satisfaction,
there is growing evidence suggesting that well-designed coordinated care for
patients with chronic conditions can be cost-effective as well.'o
States have been experimenting with various coordinated care models for
Medicaid enrollees with chronic illnesses.106 'These programs were initiated
ioo Id. at 49.
1o Id. at 50-51.
102 Id. at 50.
103 See Katie Coleman et al., Untangling Practice Redesign from Disease Management: How Do
We Best Care for the Chronically 111, 30 ANN. REv. Pus. HEALTH 385, 385 (2009).
0o4 See Jennifer L.Wolff& Chad Boult, Moving Beyond Round Pegs and Square Holes: Restruc-
turing Medicare to Improve Chronic Care, 143 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 439, 439 (2005) (discussing
coordinated care in the Medicare context).
io5 See Katie Coleman et al., Evidence on the Chronic Care Model in the New Millennium, 28
HEALTH AFF. 75,81 (2009); see also John V.Jacobi, Chronic Care and Prevention: Evolution in Practice
and Finance, 12 MARQUETTE ELDER's ADviSOR 33,42 (2010).
io6 See MaryTakach &Jason Buxbaum, Care ManagementforMedicaidEnrollees 7hrough Com-
munity Health Teams, COMMONWEALTH FUND 7 (May 21, 203), http://www.commonwealthfund.
org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%2oReport/20o 3/May/i6 9 oTakachcaremgmtMedic-
aid enrollees community_hltteams_.2o.pdf (assessing coordinated care models in Alabama,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Vermont) [hereinafter
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relatively recently, most since 2006, and robust evaluative data are not yet
available.' 0 Preliminary evaluations, however, suggest that coordinated care
models control costs for their complex enrollees.'0 In addition, these models
can stretch the capacity of the limited number providers engaged in treating
complex Medicaid patients:
[C]ommunity health teams can help increase capacity in small and medium-
sized primary care practices that have faced challenges meeting the intense
behavioral health, chronic illness, and social needs of their Medicaid patients.
Sharing resources allows small and medium-size practices to enhance their
capacity and fulfill aspirations to participate in medical home, health home,
or accountable care programs.H
These programs were templates on which the ACAs "health home" provision
was based.110 The ACA's health home provision permits states, at their option,
to add services for home care for people with chronic illnesses."' The services
included in the home care program include: "comprehensive case management;
care coordination and health promotion; comprehensive transitional care .. .;
patient and family support; referral to community and social support services;
[and] use of health information technology to link services, as feasible and
appropriate."11' The Department of Health and Human Services has provided
guidance to states, further describing the structure of the program."3 The
ACA encourages states to adopt health home models by providing planning
grants to assist states in evaluating these programs,"' and by providing federal
Takach & Buxbaum, Community Health Teams]; see also Mary Takach, About Half of the States Are
Implementing Patient-Centered Medical Homesfor 7heir Medicaid Populations, 3 HEALTH AFF. 2432,
2432 (2012) ("Since 2oo6 twenty-five states have implemented new payment systems or revised ex-
isting ones so that primary care providers can function as patient-centered medical homes.") [here-
inafter Takach, State Patient-CenteredMedical Homes]; KELLY DEVERS ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., INNOVATIVE MEDICAID
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY AND QUALITY OF CARE: A LOOK AT FIVE STATE
INITIATIVES I (Sept. 1, 2011), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2o3//8224.pdf
(discussing efforts in Alabama, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
107 See Takach, State Patient-Centered Medical Homes, supra note io6, at 2438.
1o8 See Takach & Buxbaum, Community Health Teams, supra note io6, at 15 (discussing studies
conducted in North Carolina and Vermont).
109 Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
io ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2703, I24 Stat. 1z9 (2oio) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § I396w-4
(2012)).
In 42 U.S.C. § 396w-4(a) (2012). For purposes of this provision, "people with chronic condi-
tions" include enrollees with two chronic conditions, one chronic condition and at risk of another,
or one "serious and persistent mental health condition."42 U.S.C. § 139 6w- 4(h)(I)(A)(ii).
112 42 U.S.C. § 139 6w- 4 (h)(4 )(B).
113 Health Homes, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Long-Term-Services-and-Support/Integrating-Care/
Health-Homes/Health-Homes.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
114 42 U.S.C. § I396w-4(c)(3).
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matching funds for the program's health home services,"s many of which are
not otherwise services subject to federal match."' In addition, for the first two
years of operation of the health homes, states receive an enhanced federal match
of ninety percent for the health home payments."'
The health homes encouraged by the ACA, should they perform as early
prototypes appear to indicate, offer innovative mechanisms for providing cost-
effective, clinically appropriate services to the high-cost enrollees driving much
of the Medicaid program's costs. 'hey accomplish this by encouraging twenty-
first century coordinated clinical care-rather than twentieth century acute
care-for the growing number of enrollees with complex chronic illnesses.
This method has a threefold promise: it can reduce cost, improve outcomes,
and stretch the limited provider resources available to many states' Medicaid
programs.
C. Accountable Care-Like Models
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) build on the coordinated
care models described above. According to a definition by leaders in their
development, "ACOs consist of providers who are jointly held accountable
for achieving measured quality improvements and reductions in the rate of
spending growth.""8 'Ihese ends are to be achieved by using:
[S]everal mechanisms, including disease management programs; improved
care coordination; alignment of incentives for physicians and hospitals via
shared savings; use of nonphysician providers, such as nurse practitioners and
other health professionals; and the formation of patient-centered medical
homes. Other key mechanisms are the use of health care information
technology and pay-for-performance." 9
In concept, ACOs are intended to perform like long-established integrated
health care entities, such as the Geisinger Health System or the Cleveland
Clinic, which over many years or decades have developed true, functioning
clinical and business integration, thereby permitting them to deliver excellent
care at an efficient cost.
The ACA authorized the operation of ACOs in the Medicare system and
set up mechanisms for their formation and processes by which ACOs would
share savings, if any, garnered from their efficient and effective operation with
the Medicare program. 20 As the description of the means by which ACOs
115 42 U.S.C. § s39 6w-4 (h)(4 )(B).
n6 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4(c)(I).
7 Id.; Health Homes, supra note zz3.
uS Mark McClellan et al., ANational Strategy to PutAccountable Care into Practice, 29 HEALTH
AF. 982, 982 (2oo).
uig Lawton R. Burns & Mark V. Pauly, Accountable Care Organizations May Have Dificulty
Avoiding the Failures ofIntegrated Delivery Networks of the 1990s,31 HEALTH AFF. 2407, 2407 (2012).
120 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022,124 Stat. uz9 (2010) (codified at 4 2 U.S.C. § 1395jJJ (2012)).
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will attempt to achieve efficiencies makes clear, they are to some extent built
upon a base of coordinated care in physician practiceS.121 The ACA provisions
governing ACOs build upon that model, however, to include a wider range of
providers, like hospitals, because controlling the cost of hospital utilization is
important to cost containment. 22 The ACO model will be a challenge for many
organizations as they attempt to achieve clinical and financial integration.
The challenge will be heightened by attempts to achieve those steps in an
environment in which Medicaid HMOs continue to occupy central positions.
After all, HMOs and other previous integrative models were also intended to
improve affordability and quality through clinical and financial integration,123
and it is not clear that both models can coexist.'24
The ACA does not include a provision for ACOs in the Medicaid program.
Nevertheless, some versions ofMedicaid ACOs are in the planning or formation
stages.12s These organizational structures are in their infancy. Researchers have
identified state goals for Medicaid ACOs as similar to the federal government's
interest in Medicare ACOs-that is, a combination of improving the quality of
care and containing cost:
The structure of Medicaid ACO initiatives is influenced by individual states'
history and experience with managed care, other existing care delivery
arrangements within Medicaid, and the challenges inherent in serving
low-income and chronically ill populations. While Medicaid ACOs are
a strategy to more directly engage providers and provider communities in
improving care, cost-containment is also a significant motivating factor for
many states.126
The lure of the Medicaid ACO structure is understandable.Just as the adoption
of a coordinated care medical home model serves several goals in reforming
121 See McClellan et al., supra note 118, at 985.
122 See id. at 983.
123 See Bums & Pauly, supra note ui9, at 2408.
124 See MARSHA GOLD ET AL., KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMERGING MEDICAID ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS:
THE ROLE OF MANAGED CARE 4 (May I, 2ol2), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/oL/83I9.pdf.
125 See Tara Adams Ragone, Structuring MedicaidAccountable Care Organizations toAvoidAn-
titrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 1443,1443-44 (2012) (citations omitted) (discussing states'
efforts to develop Medicaid ACOs); County-BasedAccountable Care Organization for MedicaidEn-
rollees Features Shared Risk, Electronic Data Sharing, and Various Improvement Initiatives, Leading to
Lower Utilization and Costs, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 8,2013), http://www.
innovations.ahrq.gov/content.aspx?id=3835 (discussing efforts in Minnesota); Gold et al., supra
note 124, at 9; Tricia McGinnis & David Marc Small,Accountable Care Organizations in Medicaid:
Emerging Practices to Guide Program Design, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC. I (Feb.
2012), http://www.chcs.org/usr-doc/Creating-ACOs-in-Medicaid.pdf, Kitty Purington et al., On
the Road to Better Value: State Roles in PromotingAccountable Care Organizations, COMMONWEALTH
FUND I-2 (Feb. 4, 20), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/20Hi/
Feb/On-the-Road-to-Better-Value.aspx (discussing development efforts in Colorado, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington).
126 Gold et al., supra note 124, at I.
2013-20141 375
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
physician practices in Medicaid, so too could ACOs employ broad cooperation
among Medicaid providers to improve the quality of care delivered and enhance
the capacity of strained providers, all while reducing the cost of the program.
As the following section describes, however, the complexity of the Medicaid
program suggests that the path to a successful ACO model will be even more
challenging than the path for successful Medicare ACOs. Reaching that goal
in Medicaid will require employment of new models of evidence-based care
delivery, but also a rather old-fashioned sounding reliance on the community-
spirited motivations of the participants. This paradoxical mix of technical
proficiency and dedication to civil society values will be a challenge to achieve.
IV. CIVIL SOCIETY MAY HOLD THE KEY TO THE
EFFECTUATION OF IMPROVEMENTS IN MEDICAID
The Medicaid program, while not broken, falls short of its goal to provide
appropriate health care services to society's most vulnerable members. The
previous section sketched out how developments in health care finance and
delivery, facilitated by provisions in the ACA, might improve the clinical
services provided in the program while containing costs. Specifically, the use
of coordinated care medical homes for people with chronic illnesses could
improve the delivery of services, extend provider resources, and improve the
cost-efficiency of care provision.127 Additionally, ACOs, by aggregating many
coordinated care medical home practices and wrapping them in an organization
with hospitals and other necessary providers, could extend these gains to a
wider group of Medicaid enrollees.
The success of a Medicaid ACO venture would require excellence in
two areas that might seem strange bedfellows: the adoption and disciplined
infusion throughout the organization of up-to-date, evidence-based
clinical and business methods on one hand, and deeply rooted dedication to
community consultation and orientation on the other. The first requirement
is apparent to all observers of ACOs in other settings and has been set out by
commentators on the needs of Medicaid ACOs. For example, McGinnis and
Small, researchers for thenonprofit Center for Health Care Strategies, included
as core competencies of a successfiil Medicaid ACO:
a. Patient-Centered Care Management and Coordination: ACOs should provide
medical home and broader health home services. In ACOs, care management
resides at the point of care and is directed by the primary care team (as
opposed to the managed care organization (MCO)). Care is coordinated,
with the primary care team and hospitals jointly planning transitions from
inpatient and emergency rooms to more appropriate care settings. ACOs
should monitor the overall quality of care across their patient population,
identify health trends and issues, and use predictive modeling to identify
high-risk subsets.
127 See Coleman et al., supra note 103, at 81.
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b. Targeted and Intensive Comp lex Care Management: ACOs are structured to
serve a large patient population, ranging in acuity levels. But in order to
substantialy reduce costs, ACOs must identify, outreach to, and manage a
smaller subset of high-need, high-cost patients, with high-intensity care
approaches tailored to each patient. For low-income patients, this requires
the development of cross-functional care teams that span the continuum of
physical health, behavioral health, and social services, including long-term
supports and services.
c. Data Infrastructure and Analyticr The first two capabilities outlined above
require robust data infrastructure and analysis skills, which are frequently
lacking at the point of care. At a minimum, ACOs need timely access to
claims-based data (particularly for emergency room visits), the skills to
effectively analyze the data, and the ability to translate that information
into care management activities. Ideally, providers will have electronic
health records (EHR) that feed electronic disease registries, clinical
decision support, predictive modeling, and other analytic software. A health
information exchange across delivery system partners is essential for efficient
care coordination.n
Purington and her associates from the Center for State Health Policy advised
states on what they should recognize in their regulatory capacities as to the
structural requirements for Medicaid ACOs and focused on five factors with
strikingly similar themes: data, new payment methods, accountability measures,
promoting new (presumably evidence-based) systems of care, and supporting
coordinated care medical home models for provider practices.' 29 These are
common-sense recommendations for any ACO, and they align with the
descriptions of the Medicare ACO model.130
As difficult as these steps are, they are the easy part of developing an
organization that can act as a truly coordinated care provider serving a
community of people with demographic and socioeconomic vulnerabilities and
personal characteristics bespeaking particular vulnerability, including minority
or disability status. These community challenges are typical of an area with a
concentration of Medicaid enrollees, as is the long history of poor provider
access endemic in the Medicaid program. In addition, the communities served
by such organizations are likely to have experienced a history of the health care
delivery system's unequal treatment. In short, there may well be a trust deficit
that is likely to frustrate even the most technically proficient and professionally
dedicated management and clinical team.
A foundational tension faces these community organizations as they
organize to improve community care. The adoption and disciplined infusion
throughout the organization of up-to-date, evidence-based clinical and
business methods is the first requirement of a successful Medicaid ACO, and
128 McGinnis & Small, supra note 1s, at 2.
129 Purington et al., supra note 125 at viii.
i30 See, e.g., McClellan et al., supra note nS, at 985-87 (noting the importance of supporting
development of evidence-based care and care coordination in primary care; performance measure-
ment to ensure progress toward quality improvement; and the adoption of payment reforms that
enhance clinical and business integration).
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this requirement seems to require top-down, clear-eyed management. The
second requirement, embracing a deeply rooted dedication to community
consultation and orientation, seems to require bottom-up, consultative,
and flexible management. This foundational tension is likely to trouble the
organization in its initial stages, and perhaps throughout its life.
Indeed, there is support for this dichotomy in the literature. McGinnis and
Small, after describing three sophisticated clinical and business competencies
necessary to success, advise that regulators responsible for approving or
supporting a Medicaid ACO should act with the recognition that:
In low-income populations, poor health outcomes are often driven
by poverty and related social issues, including unstable housing and
employment, problems getting transportation, and insufficient access to a
nutritious diet. A recent survey found that physicians believe that unmet
social needs directly lead to compromised health status, but do not feel
confident in their capacity to help their patients meet those needs.
ACOs serving low-income populations are uniquely positioned to engage
community-based organizations and patients to help bridge these gaps.
Starting with the ACO certification or application process and continuing
through implementation, states and heath plans can foster provider-
community partnerships by:
* Requiring ACO governance structures to include meaningful
community and patient representation;
* Asking ACO applicants to provide a detailed community
engagement strategy;
* Requiring community and social services participation in care
teams; and
* Using community-level performance metrics to assess ACO
performance.'
Similarly, Purington and her colleagues recommend that regulators recognize
the perils of too technocratic an approach and advise requiring an organic,
bottom-up Medicaid ACO formation strategy: "Look for community-based
and regional opportunities. Experts agree it is unwise to start an ACO from
the top down. ACOs should start with provider-driven, locally developed
discussions and opportunities. States can assist in identifying, convening, and
supporting such opportunities. "132
The structure, clinical capability, and business sophistication of a well-
resourced Medicaid ACO hold the promise of advancing the goal of improving
care for vulnerable Medicaid recipients. But constituents will likely raise
concerns about the likely scale of the organization and its need to bring together
a broad range of the community's health resources to break out of historical
patterns of care delivery. To be successfil, a Medicaid ACO must exhibit the
technical proficiency of a top-down, clinically and managerially integrated
delivery system, as well as the community roots and orientation to develop
and maintain the trust of Medicaid enrollees who have experienced broken
promises in the past from both the health care delivery system and Medicaid.
131 McGinnis & Small, supra note 125, at 3-4.
132 Purington et al., supra note 125, at x.
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CONCLUSION
Medicaid is a large, enormously important platform for bringing twenty-
first century health care to the underserved, poor, and vulnerable. It is a
program with a complicated past-one that has too often earned the distrust
of providers and enrollees alike. However, it is too glib by far to conclude from
this that Medicaid ought not be used as a vehicle for improving the health care
of the poor and vulnerable now shut out of health coverage. Instead, Medicaid
should be improved. The ACA provides tools for that improvement. It gives
states the tools with which to strengthen primary care services. Building on
that, it provides encouragement and ongoing funding for primary care-driven
health homes for the most vulnerable enrollees-those with chronic illnesses.
Building still further, it encourages clinical and reimbursement innovations that
can be used by dedicated health care providers as they attempt to knit together
twenty-first century systems of coordinated care for all members of their
community. These new organizations, organized to counter the fragmentation
of services that have so long plagued many communities of Medicaid enrollees,
hold hope for real progress.
Medicaid has been a bulwark of health care finance for the medically
vulnerable for nearly fifty years. It is imperfect, but it has created a lasting health
care financing structure for communities that otherwise are without sufficient
resources to support health care delivery. The imperfection in Medicaid is
thanks in part to haphazard tinkering with its statutory structure, and in part
to a fragmented, uncoordinated health delivery system. The ACA provides
tools to improve Medicaid. The lion's share of the improvement must come,
however, not from statutory design, but from the promise of communities and
their health care providers to rededicate themselves to instantiating a Medicaid
reinvigoration that melds community engagement with sophisticated,
evidence-based care. The three essential pieces of that system progress from
small to large in scale: improved primary care, care management for enrollees
with chronic illness, and broad, community-driven systems of care dedicated to
counter fragmentation and embrace life-saving care coordination.
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